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Abstract: 
This paper demonstrates for Belgium that the combination of 1) a welfare state with 2) large interregional economic 
disparities and 3) a high federal public debt leads to large interregional net fiscal transfers caused by the interest 
burden on this public debt. We calculate that over the 1970-2002 period the combination of persistent primary 
surpluses of the Flemish region and persistent primary deficits of the Walloon region –and to a lesser extent of the 
Brussels region- increased the net fiscal transfer due to the federal debt provided by Flanders to the rest of Belgium 
to almost 100% of the total interest burden on the Belgian federal debt. This amount is considerably larger than the 
transfer amount resulting from previous “traditional” interregional transfer calculations that assume a balanced 
federal budget. This large amount results from the contrast between the following 2 facts: 1) Flanders annually 
effectively paid a large share of the interest bill, as the Flemish share in federal tax revenues is the largest of all 
Belgian regions in absolute and relative terms; 2) Flanders annually should have paid only a small share of the 
interest bill given its small accumulated share in the federal public debt over time. From 1998 onwards Flanders 
should even have received interest revenue instead of paid interest charges, given the Flemish negative share in the 
federal public debt from 1998 onwards. Given the large interregional fiscal transfers resulting from the interest bill, 
we use the political economics framework developed by Persson and Tabellini (2000 p. 345-372) to conclude that 
Wallonia and Brussels have a relative interest in continued deficit financing of federal expenditures, while Flanders 
has a relative interest in a swift evolution towards the federal budget surpluses needed to pay down the federal 
debt. 
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 This paper is a substantially reworked version of our earlier papers on the same subject, in particular of “Transferten tussen de 
Belgische gewesten uit intrestlasten op de federale overheidsschuld” (2012). I thank Thushyanthan Baskaran, Stefaan Decramer, 
Herman Deweerdt, Danny Geerts, Jo Reynaerts, Robrecht Vandendriessche, Johan Van Gompel, and Annelore Van Hecke for 
comments on current and/or earlier versions of this paper. 
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I. Introduction 
Not many OECD countries combine a high debt burden and a large welfare state with sizeable interregional 
disparities in tax revenues and public spending (which in turn may be due to interregional disparities in political 
representation). Examples of such countries are Belgium and Italy, which over the past decades have combined a 
high public debt with sizeable net fiscal transfers between their northern and southern regions. In this paper we 
propose a methodology to calculate interregional net fiscal transfers resulting from the interest burden on the 
Belgian public debt (put more briefly: net fiscal transfers resulting from the public debt, or even more briefly: 
interest transfers), and derive some policy implications from this calculation. We do not know of papers other than 
on Belgium that investigate the consequences of public debt on interregional net fiscal transfers. Examples are 
Algoed 2009, Van Gompel 2004, and Van Rompuy and Bilsen 1988. Compared to these earlier calculations of 
interregional transfers resulting from the public debt, the current attempt covers more years and argues that 
interest transfers should not be added to “traditional” interregional transfers, so as to avoid double counting. In its 
conclusion, the current paper also situates the result of our calculations within the theoretical literature on the 
political economy of debt financing. 
It can be argued that when calculating interregional net fiscal transfers, a choice has to be made between either 
calculating these transfers while assuming all expenditures are tax funded (i.e. that the budget is balanced) or 
calculating these transfers taking into account that part of expenditures are funded by borrowing. These are 2 
fundamentally different ways of net transfer calculation. It can also be argued that summing up the resp. transfer 
amounts obtained by each method would imply double counting of transfers. To see this, consider table 1, which 
calculates transfers for a fictitious country with 2 regions and only one government while assuming that all 
expenditures are tax funded (i.e. that the budget is balanced). This is the assumption most transfer calculations in 
Belgium thus far have implicitly made. As a consequence of this assumption, in fact tax revenue has to be increased 
proportionally for each region until total tax revenue equals total spending. Such an increase is presented in row 3. 
As a next step interregional transfers are obtained in row 4 by simply subtracting row 2 from row 3. 
Table 1: Usual way of calculating interregional fiscal transfers in Belgium 
 
However, it would be more correct to explicitly take into account that –at least in Belgium- in most years part of 
expenditure is debt financed. This is the aim of this paper, with the cost of making transfer calculations more 
complicated than shown in table 1. Moreover table 2 shows that a consequence of taking into account the 
distributional effects of debt financing is that the tax funded part of public spending does not generate net transfers 
anymore, and hence that transfers resulting from the interest burden and traditionally calculated transfers should 
not be added up. Table 2 shows the same fiscal situation in the same country as table 1. However, when we subtract 
the part of expenditure in each region that is debt financed (the opposite amounts of row 3 in table 2) to use them 
for transfer calculation (for more details, see the remainder of this paper), we –by definition- remain with 
expenditure per region (row 4) that exactly equals regional contribution to tax revenue (row 1). Hence transfers 
generated by the remaining expenditures are zero (row 5). 
Table 2: Calculating interregional fiscal transfers in Belgium when taking into account transfer effects of interests 
on the public debt 
 
Region A Region B Whole country
1 Tax revenue collected 50 45 95
2 (Primary) spending received 55 60 115
3 = e.g. for Region A (50/95)*115 Regional distribution of tax revenue assuming all spending would be tax funded 60.5 54.5 115
4 = 3-2 Transfers 5.5 -5.5 0
Region A Region B Whole country
1 Tax revenue collected 50 45 95
2 (Primary) spending received 55 60 115
3 = 1-2 Primary balance -5 -15 -20
4 = 2+3 Tax funded (primary) spending received 50 45 95
5 = 1-4 Transfers caused by tax funded (primary) spending received 0 0 0
3 
As said already, in Belgium in most years the overall budget is not balanced but shows a deficit. In any country, any 
budget deficit is to some extent unevenly spread over the regions that compose that country2. I.e. when 
disaggregating the overall budget geographically it will appear that some regions “run” a bigger primary deficit than 
others, or even that some regions “run” a primary surplus while others “run” a primary deficit. This year’s regional 
budget deficits add to the previous year’s public debt, and impact next year’s interest burden to be paid. Interest 
payments constitute an expenditure category which would not be part of the budget in the absence of previous 
budget deficits, and which hence would not cause interregional net fiscal transfers. Once the interest burden 
appears as a public expenditure item, it is likely to result in interregional net fiscal transfers3. I.e. it is likely to result 
in some regions effectively paying a larger part of it than on the basis of their share in past primary deficits, and 
some regions effectively paying a smaller part of it. 
However, once budget surpluses are run and as a consequence the public debt starts to decrease, a final type of 
interregional net fiscal transfers emerges, next to the “traditional” ones and next to interest transfers: i.e. 
interregional net fiscal transfers resulting from paying down the public debt. This is because:  
1) a budget surplus effectively pays down part of the public debt thanks to tax revenue that is larger than 
public expenditure and that has been “provided” to a different extent by the different regions of the country 
concerned 
2) one could argue that the share of the public debt that a particular region should have paid down, should not 
correspond to its share in tax revenue but to its share in the public debt, i.e. to its share in past cumulative 
primary balances 
We will not consider nor calculate this final type of fiscal transfers in this paper, mainly because over our period 
considered (1970-2002) -and also thereafter-, budget surpluses have been rare and small (see column 4 of table 9). 
However, once Belgian public debt will start being paid back, a new type of interregional transfer will emerge. 
Similar to interest transfers, transfers from paying down the Belgian public debt will appear considerably larger than 
“traditional” transfers, for the same reason that regional shares in the primary balance in Belgium are much more 
different than regional shares in tax revenue and in public expenditure. 
As a result of the above reasoning we arrive at the following definition of interregional interest transfers:  
Interregional transfers resulting from the interest bill on the public debt 
= The part of the interest burden that a particular region effectively pays 
MINUS 
The part of the interest burden that a particular region should pay 
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 The same holds for any budget surplus. 
3
 Interest transfers are not to be confused with the interest revenues foregone by some regions because of “traditional” net 
fiscal transfers provided by these regions to other regions. A reasoning could be that an alternative for the provision of 
“traditional” transfers would be for the transfer providing region to save them and hence to cash in on the interest revenue 
generated by these savings. However, such interest revenue foregone would still show up in calculations of “traditional” net 
transfers if we would calculate these transfers for each year within a given period, after which we would discount the annual 
amounts obtained to one single present value. 
Another confusion with respect to interest transfers is the argument made by some of the “traditional” Belgian interregional 
transfer studies (e.g. Abafim 2004, Commissie Vandevoorde 2006, and NBB 2008) that interest expenditures would not lead to 
interregional fiscal transfers because the private economic actors that hold Belgian public debt would precisely be rewarded for 
their investment with the interest bill paid. This reasoning seems to confuse the public aspect of the interest burden with its 
private aspect. Moreover, holders of public debt would also have received a reward if they had opted for an alternative 
investment. 
 
4 
=  The part of the interest burden that corresponds to a particular region’s part in overall tax revenue (by which we –
reasonably- assume that the interest burden is a priority expenditure category, so that it is not financed by means of 
borrowing; in other words, expenditures financed through borrowing are not interest expenditures4) 
MINUS 
The part of the interest burden that corresponds to a particular region’s part in the overall primary budget balance 
(positive interest part if negative part in the overall primary budget balance & vice versa) 
Still otherwise stated:  
Interregional interest transfers  
= That part of the expenditures financed by borrowing that a particular region should have benefited from given the 
share of the interest burden this region bears through its contribution to tax revenues5 
MINUS  
That part of public expenditures financed by borrowing that has effectively benefited a particular region 
In what follows we will first apply the above definition to a fictitious numerical example, after which we will apply 
the hence explained methodology of interest transfer calculation to the case of the Belgian regions. Next we will try 
to rationalize the Belgian interregional interest transfers from a political economics perspective, before ending with 
some policy conclusions.  
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 However, because of the fungibility of money, it is in practice mostly impossible to determine how a particular expenditure is 
financed, through tax money or through borrowing. 
5
 This is also the criterion used and explained in Algoed (2009). 
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II. A simple numerical example for a country with only 2 regions 
Before proposing a calculation of the interest transfers in Belgium, we explain our methodology by means of a 
fictitious numerical example, which will prove to be much more simple than the Belgian situation, but still sharing 
important characteristics with the Belgian case (as will become clear in chapter III).  
Table 3 describes the starting year T1 in a country with 2 regions A and B (and only one –central- government), 
which run a different primary balance (row 4) because they contribute the same amount to total tax revenues (row 
2) but benefit to a different extent from public expenditures (row 3). We assume for the sake of simplicity that all 
interests to be paid on the debt that is caused by the primary deficit run in year T1, have to be paid in year T26. 
Therefore interests due in year T1 are zero (rows 5 and 6), and hence also net fiscal transfers due to the interest 
burden (rows 7 and 8). Therefore also at the end of year T1 the primary balance equals the budget balance (row 9).  
However, because of the different regional shares in tax revenue and in spending (rows 2 and 3), transfers in year T1 
are not zero when calculated the traditional way, as shown in row 11. To this effect we recalculate tax revenues per 
region (row 2) as if all spending would be tax funded, resulting in row 10. Subtracting row 3 from row 10 gives row 
117. 
Table 3: T1: Both regions run a primary deficit, but of a different size 
 
Now suppose that in year T2, regional primary balances stay the same as in year T1, a situation shown in table 4. 
Hence the only difference8 with year T1 is that now interest charges have to be paid, i.e. on the debt incurred in year 
T1. We crucially assume that the entire interest bill is paid with tax revenue, as the interest bill is evidently a priority 
public expenditure9. The assumption of payment of the interest bill with tax revenue has consequences for the 
calculation of interest transfers: as both regions contribute the same amount to total tax revenue, they de facto pay 
an equal part of the interest bill (row 5). However, as the share of region B in the public debt is the higher one (row 
1), region B should pay a larger share of the interest bill than region A (row 6). This difference leads to interregional 
interest transfers (row 7). 
The difference between the share of interest transfers in the total interest bill (row 7) and the share of transfers 
calculated the traditional way in total primary expenditures (row 12) is striking: the former is far larger than the 
latter. 
Although we assume that the interest bill –as a priority expenditure- is paid with tax revenue, we assume that 
interest expenditure does not crowd out existing primary expenditures, but simply adds to it, i.e. the central 
government allows total expenditure to increase with the interest bill10. As a consequence the budget deficit (row 9) 
                                                          
6
 This assumption does not impact the size of the interregional interest transfers over our entire period considered. 
7
 In this paper we present an outgoing transfer as a positive amount and an incoming transfer as a negative amount. 
8
 Of course another obvious difference is that the public debt at the start of year T2 is no longer zero. 
9
 This assumption implies that the “last” public expenditures done, i.e. non-priority public expenditures or extra public 
expenditures, are financed with borrowing. 
10
 This accommodating stance implies that the central government allows the interest bill in turn to worsen the fiscal situation, 
opening the door to a so called interest snowball: deficits not only increasing the interest bill, but also the interest bill increasing 
 
T1 Region A Region B Whole country
1 Debt (at beginning of period) 0 0 0
2 Tax revenue collected 45 45 90
3 (Primary) spending received 55 60 115
4 = 2-3 Primary balance -10 -15 -25
5 Interests actually paid 0 0 0
6 Interests to pay given share in debt 0 0 0
7 Transfers due to interest burden 0 0 0
8 Interest transfers as share of interest burden 0% 0% 0%
9 = 4-6 PM: Budget balance -10 -15 -25
10 = e.g. for Region A (45/90)*115 PM: Regional distribution of tax revenue assuming all spending would be tax funded 57.5 57.5 115
11 = 10-3 PM: Transfers calculated the traditional way 2.5 -2.5 0
12 = (11 as a share of last column of 3) PM: Transfers as share of total (primary) spending 2% -2% 0%
6 
increases with the interest bill (as in row 6) compared to year T1. As another consequence public debt at the 
beginning of year T3 (row 1 in table 5) of course not only increases with the primary deficit (i.e. with the opposite of 
row 4) but also with the interest bill (as in row 6). 
Hence only from T3 onwards a Region’s share in public debt is composed of all of its 3 possible components, as 
expressed in the below formula: 
  
     
        
       
     
I.e. a Region’s share of the public debt at the beginning of period t equals:  
 that Region’s debt share at the beginning of period t-1,  
 minus that Region’s share in the primary balance run during period t-1, 
 plus that Region’s share in the interest bill to pay in period t-1 given its debt share 
The 3rd term, i.e. a Region’s share in the interest bill to pay in period t-1 given its debt share, equals the interest rate 
times that Region’s share in the public debt at the beginning of period t-1, and is expressed in the below formula: 
  
         
     
Table 4: T2: Both regions run a primary deficit, but of a different size (bis) 
 
Suppose now that in year T3 the previous situation drastically changes. Suppose e.g. that a newly elected central 
government implements fiscal consolidation measures in the form of a tax increase and an expenditure cut which 
only –or overwhelmingly- affect region A (e.g. because of region A’s economic characteristics being very different 
from region B’s, or because region A being much less represented in the newly elected government). This situation is 
shown in table 5: tax revenue contributed by region A increases (row 2) and public expenditure benefited from by 
region A decreases (row 3), resulting in a primary surplus rather than a primary deficit generated by region A (row 4). 
Of course, such a regional asymmetry with respect to tax revenue and expenditures increases transfers calculated 
the traditional way considerably (rows 11 and 12). However, the primary surplus of region A is not large enough to 
generate a country-wide primary surplus (last column of row 4). Because of the larger share of region A in tax 
revenue, the part of the interest bill actually paid by region A increases (row 5). In combination with the larger 
interest bill in general (compare last columns of rows 5 in tables 4 and 5), this leads to larger interest transfers (row 
7).  Despite the resulting stronger increase in traditional transfers than in interest transfers when expressed in 
relative terms, the former remain smaller than the latter (compare row 12 to 8)11.  
  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
the deficit. Such a snowballing effect risks in particular to occur if the interest rate is higher than economic growth and it can 
even occur in a situation of a primary surplus. Belgium effectively suffered from an interest snowball between 1977 and 1988, 
between 1991 and 1993, and from 2009 onwards. (NBB 2010 p. 168)  
 
11
 Basically this is because Region A’s share in the total primary deficit (-10/-25, i.e. 2/5) is considerably smaller than Region A’s 
share in total (primary) expenditures (55/115, i.e. 11/23). Or otherwise stated: Region B’s share in the total primary deficit (-15/-
25, i.e. 3/5) is considerably larger than Region B’s share in total (primary) expenditures (60/115, i.e. 12/23). 
T2 Region A Region B Whole country
1 = (1 in T1 - 4 in T1 + 6 in T1) Debt (at beginning of period) 10 15 25
2 Tax revenue collected 45 45 90
3 (Primary) spending received 55 60 115
4 = 2-3 Primary balance -10 -15 -25
5 = e.g. for Region A (45/95)*2.5 Interests actually paid 1.3 1.3 2.5
6 = (10% of 1) Interests to pay given share in debt 1 1.5 2.5
7 = 5-6 Transfers due to interest burden 0.3 -0.3 0
8 = (7 as a share of last column of 5) Interest transfers as share of interest burden 10% -10% 0%
9 = 4-6 PM: Budget balance (including interests due given share in debt) -11 -16.5 -27.5
10 = e.g. for Region A (45/90)*115 PM: Regional distribution of tax revenue assuming all spending would be tax funded 57.5 57.5 115
11 = 10-3 PM: Transfers calculated the traditional way 2.5 -2.5 0
12 = (11 as a share of last column of 3) PM: Transfers (the traditional way) as share of total (primary) spending 2% -2% 0%
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Table 5: T3: One region runs a primary surplus, the other region runs a primary deficit 
 
Suppose that the situation described in table 5 continues for another year, as shown by table 6. As a result of the 
budget surplus of region A in year T3, the debt to be assigned to region A (compare rows 1 of tables 5 and 6) is lower 
at the start of T4 than at the start of T3. Overall however, debt has still increased. These 2 facts combined increase 
interest transfers (row 7) even further, while traditional transfers remain constant (row 11), as the regional shares in 
tax revenue (row 2) and in primary spending (row 3) do not change between T3 and T4. This contrast in turn widens 
the gap between relative interest transfers (row 7) and relative “traditional” transfers (row 12). Notice that the 
change in interest transfers is entirely due to events that happened in the previous year T2 (i.e. the change in the 
primary balances in year T2), because the interest rate and the tax revenue collected per region did not change 
between years T2 and T3. 
  
T3 Region A Region B Whole country
1 = (1 in T2 - 4 in T2 + 6 in T2) Debt (at beginning of period) (including interests due given share in debt in t-1) 21 31.5 52.5
2 Tax revenue collected 60 45 105
3 (Primary) spending received 55 60 115
4 = 2-3 Primary balance 5 -15 -10
5 = e.g. for Region A (60/105)*5.3 Interests actually paid 3.0 2.3 5.3
6 = (10% of 1) Interests to pay given share in debt 2.1 3.2 5.3
7 = 5-6 Transfers due to interest burden 0.9 -0.9 0
8 = (7 as a share of last column of 5) Interest transfers as share of interest burden 17% -17% 0%
9 = 4-6 PM: Budget balance (including interests due given share in debt) 2.9 -18.2 -15.3
10 = e.g. for Region A (60/105)*115 PM: Regional distribution of tax revenue assuming all spending would be tax funded 65.7 49.3 115.0
11 = 10-3 PM: Transfers calculated the traditional way 10.7 -10.7 0
12 = (11 as a share of last column of 3) PM: Transfers (the traditional way) as share of total (primary) spending 9% -9% 0%
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Table 6: T4: One region runs a primary surplus, the other region runs a primary deficit (bis) 
 
For the sake of completeness, table 7 describes year T5, in which also the primary deficit of region B is eliminated, 
but to a less drastic extent than in region A. Because both regions now contribute the same amount in tax revenues, 
as in years T1 and T2, the new increase in interest transfers is entirely due to the increase in the debt of region B due 
to events in year T4. Table 7 shows that interest transfers can be large and can even increase in years of an overall 
primary surplus. Notice however that in year T5 there still is an overall budget deficit. Of course, because of the 
narrowed difference in regional primary balances, “traditional” transfers decrease sharply between years T4 and T5. 
Table 7: T5: Both regions no longer run a primary deficit, but their surpluses are of a different size 
 
Finally, table 8 describes year T6, in which region B additionally catches up with region A at the expenditure side 
(row 3). Of course this evolution reduces “traditional” transfers to zero. As expected however, this change does not 
affect the interest transfers, which keep on increasing both in absolute and relative terms. This is because of the 
combination of an increase in the overall debt between years T5 and T6 and the continued divergence of the 
regional shares in this overall debt between years T5 and T6. 
An additional feature we added to year T6 is that it is the first year during which not only an overall primary surplus 
is achieved (row 4), but also an overall budget surplus (row 9). Because of this budget surplus, in year T6 a de facto 
start is made with paying off the debt. Total debt decreases from 88 at the beginning of year T6 (row 1) to 86.8 (= 
88-1.2) at the beginning of year T7 (not shown). As said above, as soon as a start is made with paying down the debt, 
a new kind of transfer emerges (while transfers due to the interest burden keep flowing – and possibly even keep 
increasing as shown by the evolution from row 7 in table 7 to row 7 in table 8; and while “traditional” transfers have 
fallen back to zero in our example). This new kind of transfer -the transfer due to paying down the debt- is shown in 
row 12. It is calculated similarly to the transfer due to the interest burden, as shown in rows 10 and 11, as the 
difference between the part that a region actually takes in the debt paid down and the part that a region should 
take in the debt paid down on the basis of that region’s share in total debt. So paradoxically, once a start is made 
with paying down the debt, transfers increase rather than decrease (in our example with 0.4 in year T6, plus with 0.6 
due to increased interest transfers). This increase with 0.4 is due to the fact that Region A actually pays down a 
larger part of the debt than the part it should pay down on the basis of its share in the total debt. Of course, in a 
situation of repeated budget surpluses, total transfers will start to decrease, as the decrease in interest transfers due 
to the decrease of the debt burden will more than compensate the transfers caused by paying down the debt. 
  
T4 Region A Region B Whole country
1 = (1 in T3 - 4 in T3 + 6 in T3) Debt (at beginning of period) (including interests due given share in debt in t-1) 18.1 49.7 67.8
2 Tax revenue collected 60 45 105
3 (Primary) spending received 55 60 115
4 = 2-3 Primary balance 5 -15 -10
5 = e.g. for Region A (60/105)*6.8 Interests actually paid 3.9 2.9 6.8
6 = (10% of 1) Interests to pay given share in debt 1.8 5.0 6.8
7 = 5-6 Transfers due to interest burden 2.1 -2.1 0
8 = (7 as a share of last column of 5) Interest transfers as share of interest burden 30% -30% 0%
9 = 4-6 PM: Budget balance (including interests due given share in debt) 3.2 -20.0 -16.8
10 = e.g. for Region A (60/105)*115 PM: Regional distribution of tax revenue assuming all spending would be tax funded 65.7 49.3 115
11 = 10-3 PM: Transfers calculated the traditional way 10.7 -10.7 0
12 = (11 as a share of last column of 3) PM: Transfers (the traditional way) as share of total (primary) spending 9% -9% 0%
T5 Region A Region B Whole country
1 = (1 in T4 - 4 in T4 + 6 in T4) Debt (at beginning of period) (including interests due given share in debt in t-1) 14.9 69.6 84.5
2 Tax revenue collected 60 60 120
3 (Primary) spending received 55 60 115
4 = 2-3 Primary balance 5 0 5
5 = e.g. for Region A (60/120)*8.5 Interests actually paid 4.2 4.2 8.5
6 = (10% of 1) Interests to pay given share in debt 1.5 7.0 8.5
7 = 5-6 Transfers due to interest burden 2.7 -2.7 0
8 = (7 as a share of last column of 5) Interest transfers as share of interest burden 32% -32% 0%
9 = 4-6 PM: Budget balance (including interests due given share in debt) 3.5 -7.0 -3.5
10 = e.g. for Region A (60/105)*115 PM: Regional distribution of tax revenue assuming all spending would be tax funded 57.5 57.5 115
11 = 10-3 PM: Transfers calculated the traditional way 2.5 -2.5 0
12 = (11 as a share of last column of 3) PM: Transfers (the traditional way) as share of total (primary) spending 2% -2% 0%
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Table 8: T6: Both regions run a primary surplus, of the same size 
 
 
  
T6 Region A Region B Whole country
1 = (1 in T5 - 4 in T5 + 6 in T5) Debt (at beginning of period) (including interests due given share in debt in t-1) 11.4 76.6 88.0
2 Tax revenue collected 60 60 120
3 (Primary) spending received 55 55 110
4 = 2-3 Primary balance 5 5 10
5 = e.g. for Region A (60/120)*8.8 Interests actually paid 4.4 4.4 8.8
6 = (10% of 1) Interests to pay given share in debt 1.1 7.7 8.8
7 = 5-6 Transfers due to interest burden 3.3 -3.3 0
8 = (7 as a share of last column of 5) Interest transfers as share of interest burden 37% -37% 0%
9 = 4-6 Budget balance (including interests due given share in debt) 3.9 -2.7 1.2
10 = e.g. for Region A (60/120)*1.2 Debt actually paid down 0.6 0.6 1.2
11 = e.g. for Region A (11.4/88)*1.2 Debt to pay down given share in debt 0.2 1.0 1.2
12 = 10-11 Transfers due to paying down the debt 0.4 -0.4 0.0
13 = 7+12 Total transfers 3.7 -3.7 0.0
10 = e.g. for Region A (60/105)*115 PM: Regional distribution of tax revenue assuming all spending would be tax funded 55 55 110
11 = 10-3 PM: Transfers calculated the traditional way 0 0 0
12 = (11 as a share of last column of 3) PM: Transfers (the traditional way) as share of total (primary) spending 0% 0% 0%
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III. Calculating Belgian interregional transfers due to the interest burden on the federal debt 
Assumptions made: 
1) Because we only have the necessary data from 1970 onwards, we can only calculate interest transfers from 
1970 onwards. Our data source for regional shares in federal expenditures and revenues is Van Gompel 
(2004), which is in turn based on Van Rompuy and Bilsen (1988) and Dottermans (1997). These sources have 
calculated the interregional distribution of all federal revenues and expenditures through approximation of 
these distributions by: 
a. relevant regional population shares (e.g. share of the young with respect to school grants and child 
benefits, share of over 60 years old for retirement benefits)  
b. gross regional product (corrected for gross incomes of commuters to other regions so as to avoid an 
overestimation of the share of Brussels, the Belgian region with by far the largest share of 
employees living in another region) (e.g. for government purchases of goods and services and for 
VAT) 
c. gross regional value added (for the corporate income tax)  
d. number of employees weighted by gross wage bill and number of self-employed weighted by their 
value added (both for social security contributions).  
It should be noted that the federal government does not publish regionally disaggregated data on federal 
expenditures and revenues (let alone on regional primary balances). Exceptions are data on the region of 
residence of federal civil servants (allowing to distribute the federal public wage bill over the Belgian 
regions), regional shares in the personal income tax, regional shares in the number of unemployed, and 
regional shares in the federal grants to the Belgian Regions & Communities. Another exception are the so 
called “Regional accounts” of the NBB, which disaggregate geographically since 1995 only social security 
contributions and social expenditures, and which would enable us to approximate regional primary balances 
with regional differences between social security contributions and social expenditures. However, we prefer 
to use the data of Van Gompel because Van Gompel provides a regional disaggregation of federal revenues 
and expenditures as a whole for every single year between 1970 and 2002, a period crucially encompassing 
the years of build-up of the large Belgian federal debt.  
We could have extended our sample period until 2010, as CERPE (2011) calculates regional primary balances 
for the 2006-2010 period12, but because of possible different methodologies for the calculation of these 
primary balances, we have chosen not to. CERPE (2011) obtains smaller primary surpluses for Flanders over 
its period considered compared to the last years of our period, while obtaining larger primary deficits for 
Wallonia. We estimate that the size of the interregional interest transfers has broadly remained similar after 
2002, in particular when expressing these transfers as a % of the total interest burden. 
 
2) For the starting year 1970 we assume –due to lack of data for preceding years- that regional shares in the 
public debt equal regional shares tax revenue, i.e. we assume that the more a region contributed to tax 
revenue, the more it benefited from spending financed by borrowing, thereby avoiding interest transfers13. 
This is a conservative/prudent assumption, as Dottermans (1997) finds “traditional” transfers from Flanders 
to Wallonia already from 1964 onwards. Combined with the fact that the build-up of the Belgian public debt 
already started before 1970 (though rather slowly compared to the years after 1970), these “traditional” 
transfers imply a share of Flanders in the public debt that is lower than its share in tax revenue.  
However, as an extra robustness check, we have even more prudently assumed that in 1970 the share of 
Flanders in the public debt was 100%. This assumption of course reduces the interest transfers provided by 
Flanders since 1970 but they remain very large, e.g. when compared to interregional fiscal transfers in 
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 Likewise, Jennes (2012) calculated “traditional” interregional transfers for the 2007-2009 period. 
13
 Assuming regional shares in tax revenue before 1970 were the same as in 1970. 
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Belgium according to previous traditional calculations. E.g. while the interest transfer out of Flanders is 5.6% 
of GDP (i.e. 14.6 billion euros) in 2002 –equalling 92% of the total interest bill- when assuming that in 1970 
regional shares in the public debt equal regional shares in tax revenue, the resp. numbers are 3.6% of GDP 
(i.e. 9.4 billion nominal euros) and 59% when assuming that in 1970 the share of Flanders in the public debt 
was 100%. As a final robustness check, we have assumed that in 1970 total Belgian public debt was zero, i.e. 
that the build-up of the Belgian public debt only started in the year for which we have data on regional 
primary balances. Under this assumption the interest transfer out of Flanders is hardly lower than under our 
baseline assumption (regional shares in the public debt equalling regional shares in tax revenue): 5.1% of 
GDP (i.e. 13.3 billion euros) in 2002 –equalling 84% of the total interest bill. 
 
3) We assume that the Belgian regions Flanders, Wallonia and Brussels were already relevant political actors in 
1970. Indeed, it makes little sense to assign tax revenues and expenditures to geographical areas if those 
geographical areas do not simultaneously correspond to political institutions with responsibilities that 
potentially impact those revenues and expenditures14. We see 2 arguments to treat our 3 regions already as 
political actors from 1970 onwards.  
Firstly, the 2 of the 3 major political parties in the history of Belgium (the Christian-democrats and the 
liberals) split up into a Flemish and a Francophone political party, resp. in 1971 and 1972. The 3rd major 
party, the socialist party, suffered from internal conflicts between Flemish and Francophone members 
throughout the 1970s, before also splitting up in 1978. This implied that from 1978s onwards, no single party 
represented in the federal parliament obtained votes nor even ran for elections both in Flanders and 
Wallonia15. Hence, we may broadly assume that from the start of our period, all Belgian political parties had 
an incentive to skew taxation and expenditure in favour of their region, exception made for the then still 
largely bilingual capital of Brussels.  
Secondly, in 1970 a change of the constitution took place which established the 2 largest of the current 3 
Belgian regions (Flanders and Wallonia, while Brussels obtained special status as the capital of Belgium), and 
also the current 3 Belgian communities (the Flemish, the Francophone and the German speaking 
communities). But in 1970 only the communities acquired responsibilities, moreover only with respect to 
culture, due to which the Belgian central government kept control over the bulk of revenue and 
expenditure16. The 3 regions only obtained substantial expenditure responsibilities at the occasion of the 
1980 constitutional change, including economic competencies.  
Therefore, as a robustness check, we have only started calculating interest transfers in 1980, assigning the 
public debt at the end of 1979 to the regions according to regional shares in tax revenue. This change of 
starting date for our calculations reduces the interest transfers provided by Flanders at the end of our 
period, but they remain very large, e.g. when compared to interregional fiscal transfers in Belgium according 
to previous traditional calculations. E.g. while the interest transfer out of Flanders is 5.6% of GDP (equalling 
14.6 billion euros) in 2002 –equalling 92% of the total interest bill- when starting to assign the public debt 
according to regional shares in tax revenue in 1970, the resp. numbers are 4.4% of GDP (equalling 11.5 
billion nominal euros) and 72% when starting to assign the public debt according to regional shares in tax 
revenue in 1980.  
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 Some object to calculating fiscal transfers between Belgian regions that e.g. Belgian provinces would be an equally relevant (or 
equally irrelevant, depending on one’s view on calculating geographical fiscal transfers) geographical division. However, as 
opposed to Belgian regions, Belgian provinces hardly have competences, let alone economic competencies. 
15
 With the exception of the electoral district of Brussels-Halle-Vilvoorde, where all parties represented in the federal parliament 
kept running. We know only of India as another democracy and federal country in which the federal government coalition 
sometimes consists to an important extent of parties that run for election only in one or a limited number of states. However, in 
India the limited geographical and cultural basis of political parties supporting the federal government does not hold for the 
largest parties, and also is a rather recent phenomenon, having come into existence only in the 1990s. 
16
 With the exception of municipal taxation and expenditure. 
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4) As only data on regional shares in total tax revenue is available, we need to make the –minor- error to 
assume that the interest burden is paid out of total tax revenues, i.e. including social security contributions, 
while in fact, as social security contributions are earmarked to social security expenditures, the interest 
burden is paid out of tax revenues minus social security contributions. We may however assume that this 
additional assumption does not have a major impact on our results, as regional shares in social security 
contributions (residence basis) do not differ sufficiently from regional shares in tax revenues other than 
social security contributions, to considerably change our results. 
Table 9 summarizes the method and the results of our calculations. As a first step, we have to calculate regional 
primary balances (expressed as a % of Belgian GDP) (columns 3), i.e. the differences between regional contributions 
to tax revenue (columns 1) and regionalized primary spending (columns 2) when we express columns 1 and 2 as a % 
of Belgian GDP. We notice that over our sample period, Flanders increases its share in tax revenue much more 
strongly than that it increases its share in primary spending. In contrast, the (negative) gap between Wallonia’s share 
in tax revenue and its share in primary spending remains about constant over our sample period. Still different is 
Brussels, which evolves from a share in tax revenue that is larger than its share in primary spending to the inverse 
situation. 
These contrasting evolutions of columns 1 and 2 (expressed as shares of total) result in even more contrasting 
primary balances (expressed as shares of GDP), precisely because total primary spending was considerably larger 
than total tax revenue during several years of our period considered. E.g. while the Flemish share in tax revenue was 
higher than its share in primary expenditures in any single year of our sample period, Flanders still ran a primary 
deficit in every single year before 1983. Likewise, while the Walloon share in tax revenue was lower than its share in 
primary expenditures in any single year of our sample period, Wallonia still ran a primary surplus from 1993 until and 
including 1997. 
The Flemish primary balance is negative during the 1st subperiod that we are able to distinguish, 1970-198217, but 
turns positive during the next 2 subperiods we are able to distinguish, 1983-199418 and 1995-200219. From 1986 
onwards the Flemish surpluses are large enough to make the overall primary balance turn positive. But in particular 
the 3rd subperiod –which we distinguish because from 1995 onwards20 also the overall budget balance (column 4) 
turns positive in several years- is marked by very large Flemish primary surpluses. In contrast, the Walloon primary 
balance remains negative over our entire period, except for the years 1993-1997 (and becomes very negative 
towards the end of the 1st subperiod). Brussels evolves broadly from primary surpluses in the 1st subperiod, over 
primary deficits in the 2nd subperiod, back to primary surpluses in the 3rd subperiod. 
As a next step, we calculate regional –“caused”- shares in the total public debt (at the beginning of each year) 
(expressed as a % of Belgian GDP) (columns 6)21. Crucially, in each year, a region’s debt share is calculated as the sum 
of its debt share at the beginning of the previous year, its primary deficit run over the previous year (or the opposite 
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 This 1
st
 subperiod broadly corresponds to years T1 and T2 of our numerical example (tables 3 and 4). 
18
 The 1983-1994 subperiod was preceded by the December 1981 elections, which resulted in a coalition change, resulting in 
turn in a prolonged fiscal consolidation effort until 1987. This 2
nd
 subperiod broadly corresponds to years T3 and T4 of our 
numerical example (tables 5 and 6). 
19
 This 3
rd
 subperiod broadly corresponds to years T5 of our numerical example (table 7). 
20
 In 1992 a new government took office, starting a prolonged budget consolidation in view of accession to the euro zone. This 
government was re-elected in 1995. 
21
 In columns 6 we also show total Belgian debt as a share of Belgian GDP. Remarkably, from 1970 until 1976 the share of total 
Belgian debt in GDP steadily decreases despite the steadily worsening Belgian primary balance in columns 3. This paradox is 
explained by the relatively strong nominal economic growth and relatively low nominal interest rates over this period. 
Conversely, columns 6 show that the public debt continued to increase from 1985 until  1993 despite a positive and increasing 
primary balance (columns 3). This paradox is explained by the relatively weak nominal economic growth and relatively high 
nominal interest rates over this period. However, in nominal euros total Belgian public debt increased steadily over our entire 
period considered. 
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of its primary surplus in case of a primary surplus), and its –“caused”- share in the interests that are due in the 
previous year. The latter simply corresponds to its debt share in the previous period (expressed in % of total debt) 
multiplied by the total interest burden (columns 7)22. Hence, when having calculated –“caused”- regional debt shares 
for a particular year, we can easily calculate –“caused”- regional interest burden shares for that same year. In other 
words the regional “caused” debt shares are the debts the resp. regions would have accumulated under the 
assumption that the 3 regions would have been independent countries from the start of our period considered. Note 
that from 1987 onwards the Flemish share in total debt (expressed as a % of Belgian GDP) (columns 6) starts to 
decrease (while total debt continues to increase until 1993), as a consequence of the ever growing Flemish primary 
surplus. Also note that from 1986 onwards the Flemish “caused” share in the interest burden (expressed as a % of 
Belgian GDP) (columns 7) starts to decrease (while the total interest burden continues to increase until 1990), as a 
consequence of the decreasing Flemish debt share.  
The last but one step is then to calculate regional interest shares not on a “caused” but on a de facto “paid” basis 
(columns 8), i.e. simply according to regional shares in tax revenue (columns 1). Note that the Flemish interest bill –
on a “paid” basis”- starts to decrease later than the Flemish “caused” interest bill, and that it also decreases more 
slowly.  
The difference between the “caused” and “paid” interest shares then corresponds to interregional interest transfers 
(columns 9). Columns 10 simply express columns 9 as a share of the total annual interest bill. Columns 9 and 10 show 
that the interest transfers from Flanders -to Wallonia over our entire period, and to Brussels from 1990 onwards- are 
positive and increasing over our entire period. At the end of our period, interest transfers from Flanders almost 
equal the entire interest bill. In nominal euros interest transfers out of Flanders have increased from 9.2 billion in 
1995 to 14.6 billion in 2002. Note that Brussels is a far smaller region than Wallonia, which partly explains why 
interest transfers to Brussels are far smaller than those to Wallonia. The large interest transfers from Flanders to 
Wallonia and Brussels are the combined effect of the rather small part of the interest bill effectively paid by Wallonia 
and Brussels (columns 8), which is due to their rather small (and decreasing) share in total tax revenue (columns 1), 
and –much more importantly- the very large part of the interest bill Wallonia and Brussels should have paid 
(columns 7) on the basis of their shares in total debt (columns 6).  
At the end of our period interest transfers from Flanders are more than double the amount of transfers calculated in 
a number of studies undertaken during the previous decade. (see e.g. Algoed 2008) These studies assumed that all 
expenditures were tax funded, i.e. that there was a total primary balance of zero23 (as correctly pointed out by 
Algoed (2009 p. 8)). In a nutshell, the difference between interest transfers and “traditional” transfers is large 
because regions –at least in Belgium- differ much more in terms of their primary balances as a % of GDP than in 
terms of the difference between their shares in total expenditure and their shares in total tax revenue. (see columns 
1 until 3 of table 9) 
Columns 6 of table 9 show that from 2001 onwards, and due to the successive primary deficits of Wallonia over our 
entire period –i.e. due to its persistent debt accumulation-, Wallonia’s regionalized debt is even larger than total 
Belgian debt. As a consequence, columns 7 show that the interest bill Wallonia should pay is even larger than the 
total interest bill. These facts are precisely explained by the facts that at the same end of our period the Flemish 
share in the public debt has become negative, and hence also its part of the interest bill it should pay. In other 
words, the successive primary surpluses of Flanders since 1983 have enabled it to pay down its entire debt 
accumulated before 1983, and have even enabled Flanders to accumulate –intra-Belgian- savings from 1998 
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 Hence a region’s “caused” interest amount in year t-1 in columns (6) returns as a component of a region’s “caused” debt 
amount in year t in columns 5. 
23
 We also have found such a traditional calculation of interregional fiscal transfers for Canada, i.e. between Canadian provinces. 
(Bird and Vaillancourt 2007) This study explicitly acknowledges that it assumes that the Canadian federal budget had been 
balanced in every year for which it calculates interregional transfers.  
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onwards, savings which have generated –intra-Belgian- interest income to the benefit of Flanders rather than an 
interest bill to be paid by Flanders. Still otherwise stated: the savings of Flanders on the one hand and the Walloon 
debt which is even larger than the total Belgian debt on the other hand are 2 sides of the same coin. The Walloon 
“surplus debt” is precisely made possible by the Flemish savings. As a consequence, we estimate that shortly after 
the end of our period, interest transfers have increased to more than 100% of the total interest bill. 
Finally it is striking from table 9 that absolute and relative interest transfers keep strongly increasing even: 
 after 1991, the year in which the total interest bill (expressed as a % of GDP) starts to decrease,  
 after 1993, the year in which the combined primary balance of Wallonia and Brussels turns positive (columns 
3),  
 after 1995, the year in which the budget balance turns positive in several years (columns 4).  
The effects of these 3 evolutions are more than compensated by the divergent evolution of regional primary 
balances (columns 3) that continues after 1991. 
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Table 9: Calculation of interregional interest transfers in Belgium (1970-2002) (in % of Belgian GDP, unless stated otherwise) 
 
* Belgian budget balance (% of GDP) 
** Implicit interest rate, i.e. interest burden in year t as a share of Belgian public debt in year t-1 (%) 
Year Share in tax revenue (1) Share in public spending (2) Primary balance (3) BB* (4) IR** (5) Public debt (caused) (6) Interest burden (caused) (7) Interest burden (paid) (8) Interest transfers (9) As a share of interest burden (10)
BE FL WA BR BE FL WA BR BE FL WA BR BE BE BE FL WA BR BE FL WA BR BE FL WA BR FL WA BR BE FL WA BR BE
1970 100% 57% 31% 13% 100% 54% 35% 11% -1.7% -0.1% -2.0% 0.4% -5.3% 7.4% 65.0% 36.7% 20.0% 8.3% 3.6% 2.0% 1.1% 0.5% 3.6% 2.0% 1.1% 0.5% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
1971 100% 57% 31% 13% 100% 54% 35% 11% -3.7% -1.2% -2.7% 0.2% -7.4% 6.2% 64.2% 35.6% 21.1% 7.6% 3.7% 2.1% 1.2% 0.4% 3.7% 2.1% 1.1% 0.5% 0.0% -0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 1% -2% 1% 0%
1972 100% 57% 31% 13% 100% 54% 35% 11% -2.5% -0.5% -2.4% 0.4% -6.2% 6.4% 63.9% 34.6% 22.3% 6.9% 3.7% 2.0% 1.3% 0.4% 3.7% 2.1% 1.1% 0.5% 0.1% -0.2% 0.1% 0.0% 2% -4% 2% 0%
1973 100% 57% 31% 13% 100% 54% 35% 11% -2.2% -0.3% -2.4% 0.6% -5.9% 6.7% 61.7% 32.7% 22.9% 6.1% 3.7% 2.0% 1.4% 0.4% 3.7% 2.1% 1.2% 0.5% 0.1% -0.2% 0.1% 0.0% 4% -6% 3% 0%
1974 100% 57% 31% 12% 100% 54% 35% 10% -4.1% -1.3% -3.2% 0.4% -8.0% 7.3% 57.6% 29.8% 22.7% 5.0% 3.8% 2.0% 1.5% 0.3% 3.8% 2.2% 1.2% 0.5% 0.2% -0.3% 0.1% 0.0% 5% -9% 4% 0%
1975 100% 57% 31% 12% 100% 54% 35% 10% -4.7% -1.4% -3.6% 0.3% -8.8% 7.9% 59.3% 30.0% 24.8% 4.5% 4.1% 2.1% 1.7% 0.3% 4.1% 2.4% 1.3% 0.5% 0.3% -0.5% 0.2% 0.0% 7% -11% 5% 0%
1976 100% 57% 30% 12% 100% 54% 35% 10% -4.4% -1.2% -3.4% 0.2% -8.6% 8.0% 59.9% 29.4% 26.4% 4.0% 4.2% 2.1% 1.8% 0.3% 4.2% 2.4% 1.3% 0.5% 0.3% -0.6% 0.2% 0.0% 8% -14% 5% 0%
1977 100% 58% 30% 12% 100% 54% 35% 11% -3.8% -0.7% -3.3% 0.2% -8.5% 8.6% 63.4% 30.2% 29.4% 3.8% 4.8% 2.3% 2.2% 0.3% 4.8% 2.7% 1.4% 0.6% 0.5% -0.8% 0.3% 0.0% 10% -16% 6% 0%
1978 100% 58% 30% 12% 100% 55% 35% 11% -2.9% -0.1% -3.0% 0.1% -8.0% 8.6% 67.0% 30.9% 32.4% 3.7% 5.1% 2.3% 2.4% 0.3% 5.1% 2.9% 1.5% 0.6% 0.6% -0.9% 0.3% 0.0% 12% -18% 6% 0%
1979 100% 58% 30% 12% 100% 55% 35% 11% -9.3% -3.5% -5.2% -0.7% -15.0% 9.2% 70.1% 31.2% 35.4% 3.6% 5.8% 2.6% 2.9% 0.3% 5.8% 3.4% 1.7% 0.7% 0.8% -1.2% 0.4% 0.0% 14% -20% 6% 0%
1980 100% 59% 30% 11% 100% 55% 34% 11% -11.2% -4.5% -5.7% -1.0% -17.8% 10.2% 78.3% 34.2% 40.0% 4.2% 6.6% 2.9% 3.4% 0.4% 6.6% 3.9% 2.0% 0.7% 1.0% -1.4% 0.4% 0.0% 15% -21% 6% 0%
1981 100% 59% 30% 11% 100% 55% 34% 11% -10.3% -3.9% -5.4% -1.1% -18.7% 11.2% 91.6% 39.6% 46.7% 5.3% 8.3% 3.6% 4.3% 0.5% 8.3% 4.9% 2.5% 0.9% 1.3% -1.8% 0.4% 0.0% 16% -21% 5% 0%
1982 100% 59% 30% 11% 100% 55% 34% 11% -8.1% -2.5% -4.6% -0.9% -17.5% 11.2% 101.9% 43.5% 52.1% 6.3% 9.5% 4.0% 4.8% 0.6% 9.5% 5.6% 2.8% 1.0% 1.6% -2.0% 0.4% 0.0% 17% -21% 5% 0%
1983 100% 60% 30% 11% 100% 55% 34% 11% -3.6% 0.1% -3.1% -0.6% -13.5% 10.3% 112.8% 47.3% 58.1% 7.4% 9.9% 4.1% 5.1% 0.7% 9.9% 5.9% 2.9% 1.1% 1.8% -2.2% 0.4% 0.0% 18% -22% 4% 0%
1984 100% 60% 29% 10% 100% 55% 34% 11% -2.6% 0.7% -2.7% -0.6% -12.7% 9.6% 116.9% 47.6% 61.3% 8.0% 10.1% 4.1% 5.3% 0.7% 10.1% 6.0% 3.0% 1.1% 2.0% -2.3% 0.4% 0.0% 19% -23% 4% 0%
1985 100% 60% 29% 10% 100% 55% 33% 11% -0.3% 2.1% -1.9% -0.5% -11.3% 10.1% 121.8% 47.9% 65.2% 8.8% 11.1% 4.4% 5.9% 0.8% 11.1% 6.7% 3.2% 1.1% 2.3% -2.7% 0.3% 0.0% 21% -24% 3% 0%
1986 100% 61% 29% 10% 100% 55% 33% 11% 1.4% 3.2% -1.3% -0.4% -10.0% 9.8% 127.2% 47.9% 69.8% 9.6% 11.4% 4.3% 6.2% 0.9% 11.4% 6.9% 3.3% 1.1% 2.6% -2.9% 0.3% 0.0% 23% -26% 3% 0%
1987 100% 61% 29% 10% 100% 55% 33% 11% 1.3% 3.2% -1.4% -0.6% -9.3% 8.7% 131.6% 47.0% 74.2% 10.4% 10.6% 3.8% 6.0% 0.8% 10.6% 6.5% 3.1% 1.1% 2.7% -2.9% 0.2% 0.0% 25% -27% 2% 0%
1988 100% 61% 29% 10% 100% 56% 33% 12% 2.7% 4.1% -0.8% -0.5% -7.6% 8.4% 131.6% 44.4% 76.2% 11.1% 10.3% 3.5% 6.0% 0.9% 10.3% 6.3% 3.0% 1.0% 2.9% -3.0% 0.1% 0.0% 28% -29% 1% 0%
1989 100% 62% 29% 9% 100% 56% 33% 12% 3.5% 4.5% -0.5% -0.5% -7.7% 9.3% 127.6% 40.2% 76.1% 11.4% 11.3% 3.5% 6.7% 1.0% 11.3% 7.0% 3.2% 1.1% 3.4% -3.5% 0.1% 0.0% 30% -31% 1% 0%
1990 100% 62% 29% 9% 100% 56% 32% 12% 3.8% 4.8% -0.4% -0.6% -8.0% 9.8% 127.7% 37.0% 78.6% 12.2% 11.8% 3.4% 7.3% 1.1% 11.8% 7.4% 3.4% 1.1% 3.9% -3.9% 0.0% 0.0% 33% -33% 0% 0%
1991 100% 62% 29% 9% 100% 56% 33% 11% 3.0% 4.3% -0.7% -0.6% -8.3% 9.2% 129.8% 34.1% 82.5% 13.3% 11.3% 3.0% 7.2% 1.2% 11.3% 7.0% 3.2% 1.0% 4.1% -3.9% -0.1% 0.0% 36% -35% -1% 0%
1992 100% 63% 29% 9% 100% 56% 33% 11% 1.3% 3.4% -1.2% -0.9% -9.8% 9.0% 131.2% 31.2% 85.8% 14.3% 11.1% 2.6% 7.3% 1.2% 11.1% 7.0% 3.2% 1.0% 4.3% -4.1% -0.3% 0.0% 39% -37% -2% 0%
1993 100% 63% 29% 9% 100% 56% 33% 11% 6.4% 6.4% 0.3% -0.3% -4.7% 8.6% 138.0% 29.8% 92.2% 16.1% 11.1% 2.4% 7.4% 1.3% 11.1% 7.0% 3.2% 0.9% 4.6% -4.2% -0.3% 0.0% 41% -38% -3% 0%
1994 100% 63% 28% 8% 100% 57% 33% 10% 6.8% 6.6% 0.3% -0.1% -2.9% 7.3% 136.4% 24.7% 95.0% 16.8% 9.7% 1.7% 6.7% 1.2% 9.7% 6.1% 2.7% 0.8% 4.4% -4.0% -0.4% 0.0% 45% -41% -4% 0%
1995 100% 63% 28% 8% 100% 57% 33% 10% 9.4% 8.2% 1.1% 0.1% 0.1% 7.1% 133.4% 19.0% 97.1% 17.4% 9.2% 1.3% 6.7% 1.2% 9.2% 5.9% 2.6% 0.8% 4.5% -4.1% -0.4% 0.0% 49% -45% -5% 0%
1996 100% 63% 28% 8% 100% 57% 33% 10% 8.1% 7.5% 0.6% 0.0% -0.7% 6.8% 130.1% 11.8% 100.4% 18.0% 8.8% 0.8% 6.8% 1.2% 8.8% 5.6% 2.5% 0.7% 4.8% -4.3% -0.5% 0.0% 54% -49% -6% 0%
1997 100% 64% 28% 8% 100% 57% 33% 10% 8.7% 8.0% 0.6% 0.2% 0.7% 6.4% 124.7% 4.9% 101.6% 18.3% 8.0% 0.3% 6.5% 1.2% 8.0% 5.1% 2.2% 0.7% 4.8% -4.3% -0.5% 0.0% 60% -53% -6% 0%
1998 100% 64% 28% 8% 100% 57% 33% 10% 7.1% 7.1% -0.1% 0.1% -0.4% 6.3% 119.3% -2.7% 103.5% 18.6% 7.5% -0.2% 6.5% 1.2% 7.5% 4.8% 2.1% 0.6% 5.0% -4.4% -0.5% 0.0% 66% -59% -7% 0%
1999 100% 64% 28% 8% 100% 57% 33% 10% 6.7% 6.7% -0.1% 0.1% -0.4% 6.1% 115.0% -9.5% 105.7% 18.9% 7.0% -0.6% 6.5% 1.2% 7.0% 4.5% 2.0% 0.6% 5.1% -4.5% -0.6% 0.0% 72% -64% -8% 0%
2000 100% 64% 28% 8% 100% 57% 33% 10% 5.0% 5.8% -0.8% 0.0% -1.8% 6.3% 109.5% -16.0% 106.6% 19.0% 6.8% -1.0% 6.7% 1.2% 6.8% 4.4% 1.9% 0.6% 5.4% -4.8% -0.6% 0.0% 78% -69% -9% 0%
2001 100% 64% 28% 9% 100% 57% 33% 10% 6.6% 6.8% -0.4% 0.2% 0.0% 6.2% 108.7% -22.2% 111.3% 19.7% 6.6% -1.3% 6.8% 1.2% 6.6% 4.2% 1.8% 0.6% 5.6% -4.9% -0.6% 0.0% 84% -75% -10% 0%
2002 100% 64% 28% 8% 100% 57% 33% 9% 7.7% 7.5% 0.0% 0.2% 1.6% 5.7% 106.1% -29.7% 115.6% 20.2% 6.1% -1.7% 6.6% 1.2% 6.1% 3.9% 1.7% 0.5% 5.6% -5.0% -0.7% 0.0% 92% -81% -11% 0%
Graphs 1 and 2 present the major numbers of table 9, for Flanders and Wallonia resp. We do not show the situation of 
Brussels graphically, because of its smaller fiscal impact24. 
Graph 1: Interest transfers from Flanders compared to the total interest burden (% of Belgian GDP) 
 
Graph 2: Interest transfers to Wallonia compared to the total interest burden (% of Belgian GDP) 
  
                                                          
24
 However, relatively speaking, the fiscal situation of Brussels may be considered as worse than Wallonia: apart from Berlin, Brussels 
is the only capital city of the EU15 countries not generating fiscal transfers towards the rest of the country. On the contrary, the rest 
of Belgium –Flanders, to be more precise- generates fiscal transfers to Brussels, which translates into interest transfers to Brussels in 
columns 8 of table 9. 
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IV. The political economics of interregional interest transfers in Belgium 
An established theoretical finding in political economics is that a political party in power seems to benefit a priori from a 
budget deficit, along the line of reasoning of Persson and Tabellini (2000 p. 345-372), with additional reference to Lizzeri 
(1999 p. 909-912) and Besley (2006 p. 210-211). This is because in the current legislature, an incumbent political party 
should expect to benefit electorally from an expenditure increase. This is the traditional common pool problem: taxation 
is general but expenditures can be targeted. But this benefit is even larger if the incumbent political party avoids to 
finance the expenditure increase with a tax increase –this is another kind of common pool problem, i.e. between the 
current legislature and future legislatures25. In Persson and Tabellini (2000 p. 345)’s wording: poor definition of property 
rights to both current and future tax revenues (or non-internalisation of the cost of borrowing in terms of future 
spending cuts) gives the incumbent parties not only an incentive to spend a lot but also to spend soon. Otherwise 
stated: debt financing arises because an incumbent party is generally not certain to be part of the governing coalition 
during the next legislature26. This uncertainty –to be understood as the expectation that power alternates randomly 
between a party in power and its competitor(s)-not only gives the party in power an incentive for re-election improving 
deficit spending now, but it also means that it may be exempted from bearing the future costs of current deficit 
financing27.  
 
Being in power even without running a deficit already enables a party to favour its constituency with extra expenditures. 
But debt financing increases the room for such current extra expenditures to be targeted to a party’s constituency. 
Moreover, at the same time it limits the room for future extra expenditures to be targeted to a competitor party’s 
constituency, in case a competitor party gets elected instead of the incumbent. (Alesina and Perotti 1994 p. 17) This 
asymmetry may be an additional reason why, within any coalition government, those coalition members wishing to 
prevent a budget deficit –which could be those coalition members that can be quite sure of being part of the next 
                                                          
25
 Over our period studied the major coalition members that were least sure of being part of the next Belgian federal government –
and that hence had a greater interest in debt accumulation during their coalition participation- were both Flemish and Francophone 
liberal-conservative parties. This is a paradox as rather rightwing parties are mostly associated with fiscal discipline. Over our period 
studied the liberal-conservative parties were only part of the federal coalition during the 1974-77, 1982-87, and 1999-2003 
legislatures. Both Christian-democratic parties were always part of the governing coalition except from 1999 onwards. Both socialist 
parties were always part of the governing coalition except during the 1974-77 and 1982-87 legislatures. (One critique to our 
definition of uncertainty as “years of past coalition participation” is that parties may not have been able to assess this number of 
years ex ante.) Also, the coalitions including the liberal-conservatives were “minimal winning coalitions”, i.e. were supported by tight 
majorities in parliament: the 1974-77 government was supported by only 53% of parliamentary seats, while the 1982-85 and the 
1985-87 governments –supported by 53% resp. 54% of parliamentary seats- did not even have the support of the majority of the 
Francophone seats. Moreover, in the 1981 elections the Christian-democrats lost heavily (while still remaining in power) and in the 
1985 elections the liberal-conservatives lost heavily (while still remaining in power). An exception is the 1999-03 government, which 
was a large coalition. While the 1974-77 and 1999-2003 legislatures were characterized by loose fiscal policy, the 1982-87 
legislatures were characterized by considerable fiscal consolidation efforts. This is a paradox given the statement of Alesina and 
Drazen (1988 p. 25) that successful stabilisations may be expected after elections with a clear winner. Interestingly, the fiscal 
loosening up after 1999 implemented by a coalition including the liberal-conservatives consisted to an important extent of the 2001 
tax decrease. Hence we should understand “a debt funded expenditure increase” to possibly take the shape of a targeted tax 
decrease not compensated by a tax increase elsewhere. Between 1999 and 2010 Didier Reynders was without interruption the 
Francophone liberal finance minister of Belgium. The opposition suspected him during his entire ministership not to care as much 
about a balanced budget as about targeted tax reductions for his –liberal-conservative- constituency. During his reign there were 
few years with a budget surplus, and the primary surplus strongly decreased.  
26
 In fact, Alesina and Tabellini (1987) already came to this result. 
27
 Persson and Tabellini (2000 p. 367) note that uncertainty of re-election is higher for coalition governments than for single party 
governments. 
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government28- may face a more difficult task than those coalition members wishing to elicit a debt-funded expenditure 
increase – which could be those coalition members that are less sure of being part of the next government. 
 
However, there could not only be Persson and Tabellini’s group - time dimension to political economy motives for debt 
financing –typically unified governments with more or less polarized preferences more or less quickly alternating over 
time, i.e. more or less political instability-, but also a group - space dimension –typically more or less internally 
fragmented or decentralised governments at any given point in time, i.e. more or less political fragmentation29. Such a 
distinction is made by Roubini and Sachs (1989 p. 909)30 and by Alesina and Tabellini (1992 p. 342). Roubini and Sachs 
(1989) also explicitly analyse the consequences of the group - space dimension for budget deficits, and essentially find 
that the more parties make up a coalition government, the higher the budget deficits are31. They view avoiding deficits 
as a prisoner’s dilemma: all parties may prefer a balanced  budget, but in the absence of strong coordination between 
them to achieve such a cooperative outcome, each party may have an incentive to protect and expand “its” part of the 
budget. Additionally, while cooperation of all coalition partners may be needed to avoid a deficit, non-cooperation by 
one of them may suffice to cause a deficit32. 
 
With respect to the –more complex- group - space dimension to political economy motives for central government debt 
financing in Belgium, it is important to note that Belgian political parties are linguistically and hence largely 
geographically split. This split narrows political parties’ mandates and disperses their power over fiscal policy more than 
in other systems of coalition governments. Otherwise stated: such a split increases the number of veto rights over fiscal 
policy, in the wording of Persson and Tabellini (2000 p. 345). It should be admitted that also in some other countries 
there is a strong correlation between regions and political parties, such as the UK (Tories collecting mostly votes in the 
south, Labour mostly collecting votes in the north) and India (perhaps resembling Belgium the most, as several parties 
represented in the Indian parliament only collect votes in one particular state). But what is typical of Belgium is that 1) 
all of its parties are regional and 2) the constitution guarantees all 3 Belgian regions representation within the 
                                                          
28
 Most post-war central governments in Belgium were coalitions between Christian-democrats and socialists. Since the 1970s, when 
all major Belgian parties split in a Flemish and a Francophone wing, this has implied government coalitions of at least 4 parties. 
29
 Note in what follows that the uncertainty aspect that is important to the group - time dimension to political economy motives for 
debt financing is no longer present within the group - space dimension to political economy motives for debt financing. 
30
 Roubini and Sachs (1989 p. 909) additionally point at the relationship between the group – time and the group – space dimension: 
the higher the uncertainty of re-election of a governing coalition, the higher polarisation and fragmentation within the governing 
coalition. From game theory, we know that cooperation is easier to maintain if the expected time horizon over which agents interact 
is longer. 
31
 However, de Haan and Sturm (1997) have replicated Roubini and Sachs’ (1989) research, and have failed to find a relationship 
between government fragmentation and budget deficits. 
32
 While Roubini and Sachs (1989) analyse the political economy drivers of debt financing by central governments, many more 
studies are available on the political economy drivers of debt financing of lower level governments. Rodden (2005 p. 181-221) finds 
for German states characterized by partisan alignment with CDU and/or SPD over the 1978-1996 period that they ran higher deficits, 
and expected to receive –explicit or implicit- bailout grants as a consequence of these deficits. Similarly, Khemani (2007) finds for 
Indian states characterized by partisan alignment with the leading party in the central government over the 1972-1998 period that 
they ran higher deficits. A more common and better known finding of empirical research than the effect of partisan alignment on 
lower level government deficits is that grants-based fiscal federalism –and more generally the availability of grants financing by the 
central government- leads to higher deficits of lower level governments, again anticipating –explicit or implicit- bailout grants. (see 
Pettersson-Lidbom 2010 for Sweden; Baskaran 2012 for Germany; and Sorribas-Navarro 2011 for Spain) 
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government. The additional potential consequences of such a “Belgian” setting for debt accumulation are nowhere 
acknowledged in the literature on the political economy of budget deficits33.  
 
The uncertainty aspect that is important to the group - time dimension to political economy motives for debt financing is 
no longer present within the group - space dimension to political economy motives for debt financing, at least not within 
the group – space dimension in Belgium. By law a Belgian federal government needs to consist of ministers proposed by 
Flemish and by Francophone parties in a 50-50% proportion (while about 60% of Belgian population is Flemish). 
Therefore, it seems rather typical of Belgium that such polarization may well exist within the governing coalition itself, 
rather than between governing and opposition parties as analysed by Persson and Tabellini34 (2000 p. 354). 
 
One could state that what is typical of Belgium –compared to other countries in which parties and regions overlap to 
some extent- that what its institutional setup eliminates in terms of  uncertainty of regions to be represented in the 
federal government, this same setup adds in terms of regional polarisation within this same federal government. This 
polarisation is rather high since the Flemish and Francophone parties’ resp. electoral districts -Flanders and Francophone 
Belgium35- are rather heterogeneous in expenditure preferences, largely due to their heterogeneous perception of socio-
economic and demographic needs. Similar to Alesina and Perotti (1994 p. 17) and Persson and Tabellini (2000 p. 354)’s 
reasoning, such polarized party preferences provide an additional incentive to those parties only collecting votes in 
Wallonia and Brussels to make the federal government run a deficit and to steer the resulting extra expenditures to their 
electoral districts, as our above calculations show that debt-financing is cheaper in fiscal terms for Wallonia and  Brussels 
than for Flanders36.  
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 E.g. in their study of political-economy drivers of the budget deficit Roubini and Sachs (1989 p. 908) simply classify Belgium as 
another system of “multi-party coalitions with short tenure”, in the same category as e.g. Denmark and the Netherlands, although 
elsewhere (p. 930) they put forward the case of Belgium “with weak coalition governments with parties that are divided along 
linguistic and geographical lines as well as ideological lines” as a case study meriting further research. 
34
 Next to the degree of uncertainty of being part of the next government, political polarization, fragmentation, and instability have 
been found to increase the deficit (see Alesina and Perotti 1994 and Persson and Tabellini 2000). Roubini and Sachs (1989) have 
demonstrated that large, short-lived and uncohesive coalition governments lead to large deficits. These factors also seem to explain 
the large public debt accumulated by the Belgian federal government, but they simultaneously seem indistinguishably related to 
Belgian geographical polarization. While over our period studied there were 10 federal elections –i.e. on average 1 election per 3 
years while a legislature in Belgium lasts 4 years-, there were no less than 20 governments –i.e. on average 1 government per 1.5 
year. Moreover, between 1970 and 1981 there were no less than 5 elections –on average one every 2.4 years– and no less than 12 
governments, most of which were dissolved prematurely because of institutional conflicts between Flemish and Francophone 
parties. The 1970-1981 subperiod corresponds to our 1
st
 subperiod in table 9, marked by a mounting primary deficit, a mounting 
budget deficits, a mounting public debt, a mounting interest burden, and a primary deficit even for Flanders. (However, remarkably 
there were only 2 elections and 2 government dissolutions which led to a change in coalition composition during this period: in 1974 
when the Christian-democrats exchanged the socialists for the liberals as coalition partners, and in 1977 when the reverse 
happened. Hence perhaps the number of governments and elections during this period exaggerates political instability.  
35
 Over our period studied, the number of voters voting for Flemish parties in the Brussels Region has continually decreased. During 
the 2014 elections for the Brussels Parliament, all Flemish parties together obtained 11.35% of the vote. We therefore will consider 
the Brussels region as part of Francophone Belgium in the remainder of our paper. 
36
 Therefore, a path of further research could be to test empirically for a panel of countries if large interregional fiscal and income 
disparities –possibly in combination with high political polarization and fragmentation- lead to large deficits, possibly adding other 
important political-economy explanations of variation in deficits to the ones already found by Persson and Tabellini (2003 p. 179-
183) in an empirical follow-up to their 2000 classic. A potential problem with such a panel analysis is that our independent variables 
of interest are not expected to vary considerably over time. This is illustrated for Belgium by the rather stable regional expenditure 
and revenue shares over time that are visible from columns 1 and 2 of table 9. Additionally, such independent variables may be 
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In Persson and Tabellini (2000 p. 345)’s wording one could describe the Belgian common pool problem between the 
Flemish and the Francophone Belgian parties as a poor definition of Flanders’ property rights over federal tax revenue. In 
Belgium, different geographical consequences of debt financing overlap to a large extent with different intra-coalition 
consequences of debt financing (see Alesina and Perotti 1994 p. 22-26 for distributional conflicts with respect to debt 
financing within a coalition).  
Debt financing may be cheaper for Wallonia and Brussels not only in fiscal terms but also in broader economic terms: as 
the private sector is larger in Flanders than in Wallonia and Brussels combined, a worsening of the macro-economy due 
to mounting debt may be predominantly felt in Flanders. Moreover economic spill-overs between Flanders and Wallonia 
are limited in important respects37.  
Additionally, the relatively lower cost of deficit finance for Wallonia provides it with an incentive not only to let the 
federal government accumulate debt but also to postpone fiscal consolidation. Alesina and Drazen (1989) model 
consolidation postponement –i.e. postponement of agreement on the burden sharing of consolidation- as a war of 
attrition, in which the party that bears most of the cost of postponement (in our case Flanders) eventually gives in, in 
that it also bears most of the cost of consolidation. From columns 3 of table 9 it is clear that after the coming to power of 
a turnaround government in 1981 the primary balance of Flanders improved more strongly than the primary balance of 
Wallonia. The Flemish primary balance improved from its lowest point of -4.5% of Belgian GDP in 1980 to 3.2% in 1987 
(i.e. with 7.7%points), while the resp. numbers for Wallonia were -5.7 and -1.4% (i.e. an improvement of 4.3%points). 
However, an alternative reasoning could be that Wallonia and Brussels have an incentive to provoke a federal budget 
deficit exactly because they may anticipate to be largely exempted from fiscal consolidation. This is because Wallonia 
and -since the 1990s- also Brussels are poorer than Flanders, due to which Francophone parties could anticipate that a 
tax increase –in particular of the personal income tax and of social security contributions- will probably result in a 
relatively larger revenue increase originating in Flanders than originating in the rest of Belgium. In Belgium, consolidation 
seems to have a higher chance to be revenue based because of the dominance of PS in Belgian politics. PS is the 
Francophone socialist party, which has been part of all federal coalitions over our sample period, except between 1974 
and 1977 and between 1982 and 1987. I.a. due to this presence social expenditures –predominantly favouring Wallonia 
and Brussels- have so far been largely exempted  from previous consolidation efforts38. 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
eliminated from our analysis when including country fixed effects. The latter is appropriate in panel data analysis, while country fixed 
effects appear absent from the analysis of Persson and Tabellini (2003 p. 179-183).  
Because geographically split political parties is very typical of Belgium, an empirical test tailored to the Belgian context would be to 
check if Francophone Belgian politicians maximize the deficit while Flemish politicians minimize it. To this effect one would need to 
regress vote shares of incumbent Francophone and Flemish parties in the federal government during subsequent elections on the 
federal primary balance. For Francophone parties we would expect a negative relationship: if the federal primary balance worsens, 
their vote share is expected to increase. For Flemish parties we would expect a positive relationship. However, problems with such a 
regression analysis would be 1) reverse causality (it could well be increased vote share of particular parties that influence the 
primary balance, rather than the reverse) and 2) the fact that there are only 3 regions in Belgium, the latter preventing us from 
conducting a panel regression. 
37
 An example is commuting: there is little commuting between the 2 major regions of Belgium. (see e.g. Persyn and Torfs 2012) 
38
 A third alternative reasoning is along the lines of Alesina and Drazen (1989 p. 2), who predict the anticipated polarized –i.e. 
uneven- geographical incidence of any future budget consolidation itself to postpone consolidation efforts. 
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V. Conclusion 
Our calculations above at least suggest that there is a geographical dimension to the political economy of debt financing 
in Belgium. The same diverging shares of the Belgian Regions in tax revenues and in public expenditures make Flanders 
pay disproportionately for tax funded public expenditures and pay even more disproportionately the interest bill that is 
the consequence of the heavy debt financing of public expenditures since 1970. Hence calculating interregional transfers 
in Belgium is less futile than it seems: the differing regional costs of federal debt accumulation in Belgium may be an 
explanation of the Belgian history of high deficits and high debts since the beginning of the 1970s. 
The implications of our calculations strongly differ between politicians elected in Flanders and politicians elected in 
Wallonia and Brussels. Given the resp. shares of the Belgian regions in tax revenues and in public expenditures, 
politicians elected in the Walloon and the Brussels region seem to have an interest in keeping on “expanding the federal 
budget constraint” -i.e. in eliciting extra expenditures- in particular if the extra expenditures are funded by borrowing 
rather than by tax revenue39. Hence, politicians from these Regions should maximize the federal deficit, as long as the 
size of the deficit does not cause visible macroeconomic damage to their region.  
For Flemish politicians the incentives seem to be the exact opposite of the incentives of Walloon and Brussels politicians, 
assuming that Flemish voters are aware that debt financed expenditures disproportionately fail to benefit them. When 
offered to them, Flemish politicians should even favour the policy option of closing the total budget deficit with extra tax 
revenue exclusively generated in Flanders over keeping on running a budget deficit. Expenditures disproportionately 
benefiting Wallonia and Brussels are far “cheaper” for Flanders if tax funded than if debt funded.  
A remaining puzzle is the fact that the interest burden that comes with deficit-financed expenditures renders those 
expenditures more expensive than tax funded expenditures also for Wallonia and Brussels, though to a lesser extent 
than for Flanders. Debt-funded expenditures are only “cheap” for Wallonia and Brussels when compared to their cost 
for Flanders. In other words: also Wallonia –and Brussels-, while benefiting the most (on a gross basis) from debt 
financing, is a net payer with respect to debt financing, because also Wallonia and Brussels -each year- pays federal taxes 
out of which -each year- the interest bill is paid. As long as debt is not repaid, expenditures financed with borrowing in a 
particular year generate an interest bill that falls due in every of the following years. I.e. all Belgian regions may lose on a 
net basis from debt financing.  
 
Also tying the hands of competitors does not seem to explain the behaviour of Wallonia and Brussels: unlike e.g. the 
Republicans in the US, Wallonia and Brussels are guaranteed representation in the next Belgian federal government. 
 
Therefore, it seems to require considerable myopia –or even irrationality- of Walloon and Brussels politicians to prefer 
debt-funded expenditures over tax-funded expenditures. An explanation could be that the part of taxation generated in 
Wallonia and Brussels to pay the interest bill may generally be spread over the entire Walloon and Brussels population, 
while individual governing politicians may be able to target part of the extra expenditures (or targeted tax decreases) 
made possible by debt financing to their constituents. These constituents mostly only live in a particular geographical 
                                                          
39
 This interest should be understood here from a political-economy perspective, i.e. it should be understood as the “career 
interests” of politicians representing expenditure receiving jurisdictions in the federal government, as those politicians would be able 
to claim the credit for the extra expenditures. The welfare effects of these extra expenditures are a different matter altogether. E.g. 
Algoed and Persyn (2009) find an economic growth reducing and inequality increasing effect of interregional fiscal transfers in 
European countries. Knight (2004) finds with respect to pork-barrel spending in US districts that it is inefficient and that it generates 
a large deadweight loss. 
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part of Francophone Belgium40. Another intra-Francophone-Belgium explanation of this seeming irrationality may be 
that some Francophone Belgian parties may feel less sure of remaining in power than other parties, with reference to 
the political economics framework developed by Persson and Tabellini (2000 p. 345-372). A final explanation may be the 
prisoner’s dilemma type of setting suggested by Roubini and Sachs (1989 p. 924): perhaps also Francophone Belgian 
parties prefer a balanced budget, but in the absence of strong coordination among Francophone Belgian parties, each of 
them may have an incentive to protect and expand “its” part of the budget. 
 
The latter mechanisms are not typical of Belgium however. Therefore one may still wonder what is typical of Belgium 
that the incentives for myopia seem higher than in most other OECD countries, witnessed by Belgium’s very high public 
debt from a historical viewpoint. 
 
  
                                                          
40
 This is because most politicians elected for the federal parliament over our period studied only were able to collect votes within an 
electoral district that was considerably smaller than the region this district was part of. Exceptions were those few politicians running 
for the Belgian Senate. For Belgian examples of political economy motivated distribution of public expenditures to particular 
electoral districts only, see Jennes and Persyn (2014) and Jennes (2014). 
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